Preparing for the Worst: Malta’s Scorched Earth Policy
As Malta’s siege went on, the growing threat of invasion necessitated preparing for the worst: evacuating the island, leaving as little as possible behind. This was a last-resort measure kept secret, but the local population was instructed on what to do should Malta be invaded. In early April 1941 a regulation was published on the immobilisation of vehicles in civilian hands in the event of enemy landings. This regulation was amended several times in the following months and years in direct correlation to the developments in the Mediterranean theatre of war.
The first amendment (15th of November 1941) instructed vehicle owners the proper method of rendering their vehicles unusable. The instructions included smashing sumps, destroying radiators, pouring sand into oil filters, mutilating tyres, running the engine at full throttle after dumping out all lubricating oils and even setting fires. The second amendment (on the 13th of February 1942) added to the procedure of vehicle destruction the removal of all high-tension leads, smashing of carburettors and injectors, as well as puncturing the fuel tank. Such measures were deemed necessary to ensure the uniform destruction and unserviceability of vehicles as it was anticipated that enemy forces would attempt to salvage parts from several vehicles to make some operable.
The island of Gozo was also subject to this regulation and in addition, as published in the Government Gazette of 17th February 1942, precautionary measures were also to be undertaken with regards to any vessel, boats, ferries (including the Gozo ferries), and any vessel of mechanical propulsion not in regular use, were to be rendered inoperable by the removal of essential parts.
Authorities understood that civil compliance might be an issue since this was, in effect, a request to destroy people’s private property. However, should surrender have been imminent, the painful necessities of war demanded such destruction. Failure to comply with such measures would result in police intervention.
The lessons learned from the battle of Crete such as the vulnerability of paratroopers on landing, the need for a mobile reserve, and the denial of adequate landing strips for the enemy heavily influenced Malta’s response in case of invasion. The Malta Defence Scheme of 1942 emphasised the importance of immobilising landing strips and aerodromes. Safi and Krendi strips both had underground mines ready to detonate once the order came through whereas Hal Far and Luqa aerodromes were to be obstructed by the laying of tubular scaffolding. Ta Kali aerodrome was to be immobilised by a mine on the surface. Kalafrana pier similarly had demolition charges placed meant to be detonated in case of invasion.
In September 1942, the concept of surrender was still looming over the islands. Operation Pedestal, carried out in the previous month, allowed a partial re-supply of urgently needed stocks of fuel and ammunition, but the supply situation was dire at best and stocks of fighting material, food and medical supplies were only projected to last until November. It is here that one finds evidence of a secret scheme to lay waste to the islands’ military infrastructure and most war material in the event of invasion. These measures would form part of a developing Scorched Earth Policy (SEP) for Malta.
The language of the associated documents never mention the word ‘surrender’ explicitly. However, sentences alluding to such an eventuality can be discerned, such as those stating that a particular measure “may become necessary in certain circumstances”. It is also clear that utmost secrecy of this scheme was paramount to preserve the morale of both the military and the civilian population. One could discern that such a planned scheme was an anticipation of total defeat and, fearing the crash in morale that would ensue, planners agreed that “It is desired to avoid any publicity….”. Not even unit commanders were to know of this scheme until the very last moment.
The SEP outlined the systematic and processual destruction of war materials. Planned destruction of the different types of equipment was to be carried out over the course of a seven day period, each day comprising different lots of equipment. As the possibility of surrender inched closer to reality, consideration for the welfare of the civil population, and the present military garrison who would then be interned as prisoners of war, were made. These considerations limited the destruction of certain amenities such as hospitals, barracks and huts. Medicines, food, horses and any remaining kerosene, as well as camp equipment and Royal Engineers stores for building repairs were also to be preserved to help reduce the misery which a surrendered garrison and population would find themselves in.
Complicating the task of reducing war material to scrap and ashes was the apparent lack of explosives. Nonetheless, several alternative methods were proposed including smashing, burning and dumping into the sea, the latter being suitable for almost all equipment. Dumping or potentially driving equipment into the sea was favoured, as nowhere in Malta was too far away from a cliff or a beach and most equipment would be soiled or irretrievable once it touched salt water. The list of equipment meant to be dumped into the sea included items which could not be easily destroyed. Some of the equipment listed for dumping at sea were – barbed wire, bicycle spares, mortars, predictors, tools, rangefinders, small arms components, signal stores, and G.L stores.
Much like the instructions from 1941, the vehicles of the military were to be run without oil, burned, or dumped into the sea. Oils, paints, textiles, anti-gas face shields and bicycle parts were also to be burned. Destruction of weapons was planned to be left to the last possible moment in order to have fixed defences and anti-aircraft guns remain effective until the last day. Small arms were to be burned along with any remaining ammunition. Testing on older American gun barrels revealed that larger guns could be put out of action by a No 36 grenade detonated inside the barrel where the rifling meets the breach. In smaller calibre large guns such as the 40 mm Bofors where a No 36 grenade does not fit, a process of smashing the interrupted barrel threads at the breach rendered the gun inoperable.This process was noted to take approximately five minutes per barrel.
It is not desirable to start large numbers of fires too early in the proceedings as this would give clear indication to the enemy, and to the civil population, of what was going on” – WO 201 2704
Ultimately, in preparation of surrendering themselves as prisoners of war, all troops were to be issued with new uniforms readily available in the stockpiles at the time. Any remaining equipment, ammunition, benzine and anti-gas clothing, was to be burned on the final day.
During the month of October 1942, several submarine runs successfully managed to deliver small quantities of supplies to the island fortress, sustaining its defence. November and December finally saw the arrival of adequate supplies of food, fuel, and ammunition breaking the siege and improving fighting capability and living conditions of the garrison and population. In effect, they postponed and, in hindsight, negated the need to implement the scorched earth policy.
References
The National Archives, UK. FCO 141 9272 – Immobilisation of (Gozo)
The National Archives, UK. WO 201 2704 – Destruction of Guns and Equipment
The National Archives, UK. WO 193 970 – Lessons from operations in CRETE
The National Archives, UK. WO 169 14537 – Chief Engineer, Malta Command
The National Archives of Malta, Malta Command – Malta Defence Scheme, 1942